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US – China Trade War: A Way Out? 
Weihuan Zhou* & Henry Gao** 
Abstract 
Recently, a group of eminent Chinese/US economists and legal scholars issued a 
thought-provoking Joint Statement on “US – China Trade Relations: A Way Forward”. 
However, the Joint Statement does not provide practical solutions to the real issues in 
the bilateral negotiations. Moreover, by granting excessive policy space to the two largest 
trading nations, it would encourage them to further deviate from WTO rules and 
undermine the multilateral trading system. Drawing on the Theory of Distortions and 
Welfare, we put forward an alternative framework for the parties to tackle protectionist 
and trade distortive policy instruments while leaving sufficient policy space for them to 
pursue non-protectionist policy goals. Our framework would minimize WTO-
inconsistent outcomes and prevent further erosion of the multilateral system as we 
encourage the parties to negotiate in a WTO-consistent manner. Hopefully, this would 
also provide the groundwork for more inclusive trade negotiations under the multilateral 
trading system.          
I. INTRODUCTION 
The multilateral trading system is in crisis. The causes are many: the collapse of the Doha Round; 
the paralysis of the Appellate Body; the abuse of the national security exception by the United 
States (US); the proliferation of unilateral measures; and last but certainly not least, the trade war 
between the two big powers, the US and China, which has lasted for almost two years. The 
conclusion and signing of a bilateral Phase One trade deal1 on 15 January 2020 has temporarily 
prevented further escalation of the trade war. The deal, however, has left most existing retaliatory 
tariffs intact2 and has institutionalized the unilateral and confrontational approach to resolving 
disputes, which could reignite the bilateral trade tensions.3 Moreover, the deal does not address 
the more significant and systemic issues, such as China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
industrial policies and subsidies. Instead, these issues are expected to be addressed by the two 
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parties in their Phase Two negotiations.4 Against this backdrop, it is reasonable to expect that the 
resolution of the US-China trade tensions will remain a hot topic in international trade.           
As attempts to broker peace between the two, many proposals have been proffered. The latest is 
a thought-provoking joint statement entitled “US – China Trade Relations: A Way Forward” 
(hereinafter “Statement”) and issued by a group of eminent Chinese/US economists and legal 
scholars on 27 October 2019.5 As the product of the “US-China Trade Policy Working Group” 
led by Jeffrey Lehman, Dani Rodrik and Yang Yao, the Statement counts among its illustrative list 
of signatories five Nobel laureates, three former Chief Economists of the World Bank, and some 
of the leading figures in the field of international trade such as Alan Deardoff, Gene Grossman, 
Robert Howse, Greg Shaffer, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Robert Staiger, Michael Trebilcock, and 
David Trubek.  
The Statement has received good coverage in major international media. 6  According to the 
Statement, the current discussion on US-China economic relations is futile as it has been cast as a 
binary choice between either “deep integration” or “decoupling”. The Statement rejects the false 
dichotomy between the two and instead advocates a middle ground that grants more policy space 
to both countries than normally allowed under WTO rules. More specifically, for example, the 
Statement would allow “China to conduct its industrial and growth policies” and “the US to 
safeguard its labor markets and technological systems”. This is achieved by classifying trade 
policies according to a “Four Buckets” framework (Framework), which is designed to “promote 
productive negotiations about how to share the benefits and minimize the harms that attend 
bilateral trade, and to facilitate fair competition in the multilateral sphere of international trade.” 
The “Four Buckets” are reproduced below for accuracy and ease of analysis:  
Bucket 1 (The “Prohibited” Bucket): In this Bucket, Country A’s actions or policies are likely to create 
significant distortions in global markets and can be presumed to entail global economic losses. It is appropriate 
that international norms prohibit actions or policies in this Bucket. “Beggar thy neighbor” policies are canonical 
examples that fall under this Bucket. For example, country A may impose export or import restrictions with 
the express purpose of reaping monopoly pricing gains on world markets undermining other countries’ 
competitiveness. Or country A may engagement in discriminatory data policies that promote predatory pricing 
or rent extraction by national digital companies on foreign markets. 
Bucket 2 (The “Bilateral Discussions and Adjustments” Bucket): In this Bucket, Country A’s policies cause 
harm to country B without necessarily taking on a beggar-thy-neighbor character or entailing global economic 
losses. We put in this Bucket those policies for which a mutually beneficial bargain can be worked out between 
the two nations that entails the removal of the policies in question. This will typically occur when Country B’s 
perceived losses from the policy exceed the perceived gains to Country A from sticking with the policies. For 
example, Country A may engage in industrial policies that Country B’s producers consider unfair and harmful; 
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Country B may prevail on Country A to remove or scale back these policies by offering an alternative economic 
benefit (e.g., a reduction of Country B’s countervailing tariffs). 
Bucket 3 (The “Domestic Adjustments” Bucket): In this Bucket, a mutually beneficial bargain cannot be 
negotiated – perhaps because Country A’s policies bring perceived gains to Country A that exceed the perceived 
losses by Country B, so that Country B is unable to offer Country A adequate exchange for removing or scaling 
back the policies in question. In this case, Country A keeps its policies and Country B is allowed to undertake 
well-calibrated domestic policy adjustments that demonstrably aim to reduce or minimize harm to its domestic 
economy. For example, Country B may implement regulations on domestic firms to curtail the leakage of 
sensitive technological material to foreign firms. Or Country B may raise trade barriers to protect communities 
adversely affected by exports from Country A. What is essential here is that the “remedy” employed by Country 
B must be proportionate and well-targeted at the domestic objective (i.e., it is not a threat targeting Country A 
or a raising of the stakes in a trade war). 
Bucket 4 (The “Multilateral Governance” Bucket): In this Bucket, Country A’s actions or policies (with or 
without any response from Country B) are likely to affect commerce with Country B in a way that is likely to 
cause spillover damage to the economy of Country C. It is appropriate that international norms and governance 
procedures be applied to manage such situations. For example, Country A may provide discriminatory trade 
benefits to Country B, such as by agreeing to reduce tariffs on one product from Country B without reducing 
tariffs on the same product from Country C.  
According to the Statement, central to the Framework are Buckets 2 and 3 which are “designed to 
tackle cases where Country A’s policies have adverse implications for Country B, but the harm is 
the incidental consequence of, and not the primary motivation for, those policies.” 
This article seeks to contribute to the ongoing debates about how the US-China trade tensions 
may be resolved by examining the weaknesses of the Statement and developing an alternative 
framework to advance the US-China trade talks. We believe that the Statement has two major 
flaws. The first flaw, discussed in Section II, is that the Statement provides excessive policy space 
to both countries and leaves a wide range of protectionist measures unregulated. To facilitate 
negotiations, we will need some policy space, but not the excessive policy space as suggested in 
the Statement. Section III tackles the second flaw which concerns the failure of the Statement in 
recognizing that WTO rules and its dispute settlement rulings have already provided sufficient 
policy space for Member states. More importantly, the Framework is likely to set the bilateral 
negotiations in a direction which sidelines WTO rules and further undermines the multilateral 
trading system. Overall, the Statement provides little substantive guidance for the parties to resolve 
the true problems behind their trade tensions. It would not allow the parties to maximize gains 
from trade and enhance national welfare precisely because of the allowance of excessive policy 
space which creates the flexibility for the application of protectionist and trade distortive policy 
instruments. In Section IV, we propose an alternative framework which seeks to strike a proper 
balance between the preservation of policy space and the regulation of protectionist measures, a 
balance that is better-aligned with the approach taken under the WTO. Our framework is intended 
not only to avoid breaches of WTO rules but also to encourage the parties to conduct their 
negotiations in a way that would lay the groundwork for more inclusive negotiations, ultimately 
re-invigorating the multilateral trade negotiations under the WTO. Section V then offers some 
illustrations of how our framework may be applied in practice by drawing on the Phase One trade 
deal. Section VI sets forth the conclusion.            




II. EXCESSIVE POLICY SPACE AND THE LACK OF DISCIPLINE ON 
PROTECTIONISM 
The Framework allows excessive policy space and lacks sufficient discipline over protectionist 
measures. It distinguishes between beggar-thy-neighbor policies and other policies. As defined in 
the Statement, a beggar-thy-neighbor policy “seek[s] to increase domestic economic welfare at the 
expense of other countries’ welfare.” The Statement further clarifies that such policies include only 
those “adopted with express beggar-thy-neighbor purpose in mind” (emphasis added). Purposeful 
beggar-thy-neighbor policies are prohibited under Bucket 1 whereas other policies are allowed 
under Buckets 2 and 3 which are at the core of the Framework according to the Statement. These 
‘non-prohibited’ policies clearly include protectionist measures defined broadly as those adopted 
to protect domestic industries through measures conferring a competitive advantage to local 
industries or undermining the competitive condition of foreign competitors. Accordingly, 
protectionist measures or protectionism, in this paper, are not merely concerned about border 
measures but include all trade and domestic policies and measures which have the effect of altering 
the condition of competition in favour of domestic actors vis-à-vis foreign competitors regardless 
of the presence of a protectionist intent. The examples envisaged under Buckets 2 and 3 – i.e. unfair 
and harmful industrial policies, domestic regulations in pursuit of certain policy objectives, and 
“trade barriers to protect communities adversely affected by exports” – are broad enough to 
encompass all such protectionist measures. Instead of prohibiting such measures, the Framework 
essentially recommends that the parties negotiate whether they may be reduced or removed, and 
if they cannot, how their economic impact on the counterparty may be rebalanced. Accordingly, 
the Framework provides wide latitude for the US and China to exclude protectionist measures 
from a trade deal.  
The Framework is unlikely to facilitate the US-China trade talks, despite the wide regulatory 
freedom it provides. In failing to impose any hard rules on protectionism, the Framework fails to 
tackle the core problems that trade negotiations are concerned about in reality. For eight decades, 
international trade cooperation has been predominantly devoted to constraining protectionism.7 
WTO rules, the final product of multilateral trade negotiations, cover more than policies with 
express beggar-thy-neighbor purposes. For example, the Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the WTO8 targets barriers to trade and discriminatory treatment that may or may not 
be motivated by beggar-thy-neighbor purposes. More specific examples include some of the most 
fundamental rules of the WTO such as: (1) Article III of the GATT, the national treatment 
principle, which inhibits the use of discriminatory measures “so as to afford protection to domestic 
production”; 9  (2) Article XI of the GATT, which prohibits import or export quantitative 
                                                        
7  Donald Regan, ‘What Are Trade Agreements For? – Two Conflicting Stories Told by Economists, With A Lesson 
for Lawyers’, (2006)9(4) Journal of International Economic Law 951, 972-75; Donald Regan, ‘Explaining Trade 
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overview of the history of international trade cooperation, see WTO, World Trade Report: Six decades of multilateral 
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8  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 Apr. 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M 1144.     
9  The national treatment rule and the abundant WTO case law on it have amply demonstrated how the WTO 
tribunals, particularly the Appellate Body, have struggled with the issue of whether a violation of the rule may be 
established based on effect only without inquiring about intent. After years of deliberation in a series of cases, the 
Appellate Body, in EC – Seal Products (2014), has sent a strong message that the rule is concerned about the 
discriminatory or disparate effect of a measure, not the intent of it. For detailed discussions of this issue, see eg. 




restrictions irrespective of whether such restrictions are motivated by a beggar-thy-neighbor 
purpose; (3) Article II of the GATT, which allows Member governments to impose tariffs (as long 
as they do not exceed the committed/bound levels), even though such tariffs may have an express 
beggar-thy-neighbor purpose. Under the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism, the trade rules 
have been interpreted and applied in a way that seeks to discipline protectionist measures that 
adversely affect trade or the competitive condition of foreign companies vis-à-vis domestic 
industries of regulating members.10 The above is not to suggest that the US-China negotiations 
must follow exactly the WTO model. Rather, the point is that the Framework does not address 
the core problems that exist in reality and the governments’ behaviour behind these problems.11 
Most of the issues that have provoked the US-China trade tensions arise from various trade 
barriers, which may or may not be motivated by a beggar-thy-neighbor purpose. Indeed, the 
ongoing bilateral trade war has been dominated by tit-for-tat tariffs which are widely regarded as 
beggar-thy-neighbor policies.12 However, the tariffs are just one of the means that the Trump 
Administration employed to push China to yield to US interest on certain systemic issues. These 
issues, identified in the joint statement of the US, the EU and Japan (amongst other public 
announcements and official documents), mainly include China’s non-market economic system, 
SOEs, industrial policies and subsidies, and so-called ‘forced’ technology transfer.13 These issues 
are also central to US complaints about China’s compliance with WTO obligations.14 Although 
the exact demand of the US on these issues remains ambiguous, US concerns are loud and clear. 
To put it plainly, the US is unhappy with the various barriers and market-distorting policies and 
practices that China maintains to afford protection or competitive advantage to its domestic 
industries in pursuit of broader goals for economic development.15 Accordingly, the US’s central 
requests, in broad terms, are that China removes state intervention in commercial activities, as well 
as trade-restrictive and distortive policies and practices, to enhance its level of liberalization and 
                                                        
Weihuan Zhou, ‘The Role of Regulatory Purpose under Articles III:2 & 4 – Toward Consistency between 
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negotiation if the other parties reduce barriers to its exporting industries. See eg.  India Today, ‘India Open For 
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2019), available at: www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-open-engagement-rcep-nations-again-concerns-
addressed-piyush-goyal-1616055-2019-11-06.    
12  For a flowchart of the escalation of such tariffs, see above n 2, Bown, ‘US-China Trade War Tariffs’; Ralph Ossa, 
‘The Costs of A Trade War’ in Meredith Crowley (eds) Trade War: The Clash of Economic Systems Endangering Global 
Prosperity (London: CEPR Press, 2019) 45-9. 
13  Office of the United States Trade Representative, ‘Joint Statement of the Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers 
of the United States, European Union, and Japan’, Press Release (23 May 2019), available at: 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/may/joint-statement-trilateral-
meeting. 
14  Office of the United States Trade Representative, ‘2018 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance’, Feb. 
2019, available at: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2018-USTR-Report-to-Congress-on-China%27s-WTO-
Compliance.pdf. 
15  Ibid., at 5-20.  




maintain a level playing field for US companies. It is evident that these concerns and requests are 
not confined to policies with an express beggar-thy-neighbor intent but are so extensive as to capture 
all policies and practices having a protective, trade-restrictive and distortive effect that jeopardizes 
the competitive position of US companies vis-à-vis their Chinese counterparts. While the US’s 
demand that China “fundamentally change[s] its approach to the economy and trade”16 would be 
too ambitious and intrusive to be fulfilled,17 a framework which essentially leaves all protectionist 
and trade distortive policies without an express beggar-thy-neighbor purpose untouched will not 
be acceptable to either party.       
Furthermore, the Framework lacks a clear and workable criterion. While “beggar-thy-neighbor 
policies” are generally defined as those raising the welfare of the home country at the cost of 
worsening economic conditions abroad,18 there seems to be no agreement on what may constitute 
such policies. Arguably, a protectionist measure is not necessarily a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. A 
tariff, for example, causes deadweight losses to the home country and hence does not produce the 
welfare gains that a beggar-thy-neighbor policy would produce. An ‘optimal tariff’ imposed by a 
big country having the capacity to influence terms-of-trade would be welfare-enhancing at the cost 
of other nations.19 Such a beggar-thy-neighbor effect, however, would need to be established by 
robust empirical evidence.20 Even though a policy is shown to have a beggar-thy-neighbor effect, 
it will not automatically fall within the prohibited category of the Framework unless it is clearly 
motivated to have that effect. Such motivation is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to establish. 
A protectionist measure, in whatever form, may be motivated by a mix of protectionist and non-
                                                        
16  Ibid., at 20.  
17  See eg. Yawen Chen et al., “China Says U.S. Demand on Its State-Owned Enterprises is ‘Invasion’ on Economic 
Sovereignty”, REUTERS (26 May 2019), available at: www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china/china-says-u-
s-demand-on-its-state-owned-enterprises-is-invasion-on-economic-sovereignty-idUSKCN1SV0I7.  
18  See eg. Paul Krugman et al. International Economics: Theory and Policy (Harlow: Pearson Education, 11th Ed., 2018) at 
596; Thomas Pugel, International Economics (New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 16th Ed., 2016) at 485.   
19  For the historical development of the optimal tariff argument, see Douglas Irwin, Against the Tide: An Intellectual 
History of Free Trade (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996) 101-15. One could argue that the Framework 
is guided by the influential “terms-of-trade manipulation” theorem which views the fundamental function of trade 
agreements as being to restrain governments from using policies to improve the terms of trade of its own nation 
at the cost of other nations. Like the limited focus of the Framework, the “terms-of-trade manipulation” theorem 
targets policies clearly motivated by terms-of-trade manipulation only. It does not prevent countries from using 
policies for purposes other than terms-of-trade manipulation or countries without market power from using 
policies to affect trade. Consequently, the most significant policy excluded from the theory, like under the 
Framework, is protectionism. For the seminal work on the “terms-of-trade manipulation” theorem, see Kyle 
Bagwell and Robert Staiger, ‘An Economic Theory of GATT’, (1999)89(1) The American Economic Review 215; Kyle 
Bagwell and Robert Staiger, The Economics of The World Trading System (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2002). 
Notably, terms-of-trade manipulation and beggar-thy-neighbor behaviour were used interchangeably in the World 
Trade Report 2009. See WTO, World Trade Report 2009: Trade Policy Commitments and Contingency Measures (Geneva: 
WTO, 2009) xiii. For major critique of the theory, see Wilfred Ethier, ‘Political Externalities, Nondiscrimination, 
and A Multilateral World’, (2004)12(3) Review of International Economics 303; Wilfred Ethier, ‘The Theory of Trade 
Policy and Trade Agreements: A Critique’, (2007)23 European Journal of Political Economy 605. For an explanation of 
the differences between the terms-of-trade story and the protectionism story, see above n 7, Regan, ‘What Are 
Trade Agreements For?’, at 953-4; Regan, ‘Explaining Trade Agreements’, at 392-3.  
20  Whether the tariffs imposed by the US during the trade war were set at an optimal level is debatable. Studies have 
shown that the tariffs have caused a net loss to the US economy due to their impacts on consumers’ welfare and 
retaliation by other countries. See eg. Alessandro Nicita, ‘Trade and Trade Diversion Effects of United States 
Tariffs on China’, UNCTAD Research Paper No. 37 (Nov. 2019) (showing that US tariffs did hurt Chinese 
economy); Pablo Fajgelbaum et al., ‘The Return of Protectionism’, NBER Working Paper 25638 (Oct. 2019) 
(showing that the US would have made a small welfare gain in the absence of retaliatory tariffs); Mary Amiti et al., 
‘The Impact of the 2018 Trade War on U.S. Prices and Welfare’, (2019)33(4) Journal of Economic Perspectives 187 
(showing that the US tariffs led to significant deadweight welfare costs in 2018).       




protectionist policy objectives without an intent to enhance national welfare at others’ costs. In 
the context of the US-China negotiations, it is unlikely that either party would voluntarily admit or 
accept a claim (by the other party) that its existing policies are aimed at harming the other’s 
economy. Towards this end, the only measure that both parties would be willing to surrender is 
likely to be the beggar-thy-neighbor tariffs if the negotiations were to follow the Framework. 
However, to bring long-term peace to this trade war, the systemic issues (which are mostly non-
tariff measures) must be resolved in a balanced way by disciplining the relevant protectionist policy 
instruments without restricting the parties’ freedom in their choice of non-protectionist regulatory 
goals. 
In this regard, the Framework fails to distinguish between protectionist and non-protectionist 
policy objectives as well as between policy objectives and policy instruments used to achieve these 
objectives. It provides too much policy space for governments to adopt measures that do not 
genuinely serve any non-protective regulatory purpose. As will be discussed in Section IV, this 
would lead to a failure to achieve the overarching goal envisaged in the Statement, that is, to 
maximize the gains from trade.21 For international trade to be welfare-enhancing, countries must 
have the freedom to pursue any non-protectionist policy goals. At the same time, their choice of 
policy instruments to achieve such goals needs to be regulated through a balanced approach. 
Practically speaking, the Framework fails to recognize that excessive policy space may not be 
conducive to a trade deal. What governments usually need in trade negotiations is merely sufficient 
policy space so that they could secure the political support needed to reach a deal that reins in 
protectionist measures.  
We do not have a crystal ball to foresee the ultimate outcome of the US-China negotiations, or 
more specifically whether and to what extent the negotiations would address protectionist and 
trade distortive policies. Our core criticism is that the Statement fails to provide a clear and viable 
framework for the ongoing negotiations. It grants too much policy space to the two governments 
to adopt protectionist and trade distortive policies which are precisely the major issues that this 
bilateral negotiation, and indeed trade negotiations in general, must address.                        
III. FAILURE TO RESPECT WTO RULES  
In addition to the problem discussed in the last Section, the Statement also ignores the fact that 
WTO law has already provided sufficient policy space for Member governments. In essence, WTO 
rules impose different degrees of restraints on a range of policy instruments arguably according to 
the level of adverse effects of these instruments on trade.22 Such restraints include, for instance, 
the prohibition of import and export restrictions (the most trade-restrictive and distortive 
measures), and to a lesser degree the imposition of upper limits on (rather than prohibition of) 
tariffs, and the mere non-discrimination requirement on domestic measures leaving the flexibility 
for governments to use such measures to address regulatory concerns. In particular, for example, 
governments may maintain domestic subsidies although they need to remove the adverse effects 
                                                        
21  See above n 5, ‘US -China Trade Relations: A Way Forward’, at 4. 
22  See eg. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘National Constitutions and International Economic Law’ in Meinhard Hilf & 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds.), National Constitutions and International Economic Law (Deventer, Boston: Kluwer 
Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993) 3-52, 47-8. Frieder Roessler, ‘The Constitutional Function of the Multilateral 
Trade Order’ in Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds.), National Constitutions and International Economic 
Law (Deventer, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1993) 53-62. 




on the interests of other Members or face countervailing measures. Non-specific subsidies are 
generally permitted regardless of their impact on trade. Furthermore, through instruments such as 
the Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade and Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures, WTO 
Members are allowed considerable leeway to choose their own policy objectives and the level of 
protection and may adopt measures, which otherwise would be WTO-inconsistent, to meet these 
objectives. To achieve a proper balance between trade liberalization and regulatory autonomy, the 
Appellate Body has taken efforts to address the protectionist elements of a contested measure 
without impairing Members’ capacity in pursuing chosen non-protectionist objectives. 23  The 
Statement does not explain why existing WTO rules are insufficient to provide the policy space 
needed by governments and hence why excessive policy space is required to facilitate the US-China 
negotiations.   
More importantly, the rebalancing approach embedded in Buckets 2 and 3 of the Framework is 
likely to lead to inconsistencies with WTO rules. Generally speaking, the wide coverage of Buckets 
2 and 3 may well leave protectionist instruments unregulated or under-regulated, falling short of 
WTO requirements. For example, under Bucket 2, the parties may agree that China shall reduce 
and confine industrial subsidies to high-tech firms to certain levels but may maintain a limited list 
of discriminatory policies within an agreed timeframe to provide space for the production and sale 
of domestically-made high-tech products (e.g. electric cars). In return, the US may agree to remove 
or reduce a selected range of antidumping and countervailing duties on Chinese imports. It is 
evident that these discriminatory measures would breach the national treatment rule. To use this 
example the other way around, the parties may agree that China maintains its current level of 
industrial subsidies to high-tech firms for a period of time during which the US may increase tariffs 
on a selected range of Chinese imports. Such a tariff increase would not be allowed under GATT 
Article II if it goes beyond the corresponding bound level. If the tariff increase is based on an 
existing antidumping and/or countervailing duty, then it may not be compatible with the 
substantive and procedural requirements for the imposition of such duties under the relevant 
WTO agreements. This would be an example of a Bucket 3 policy. Notably, such deals are not 
necessarily “mutually beneficial”, as characterised in the Statement, for the discriminatory 
measures and increased tariffs would be detrimental to the welfare of both countries. 
Finally, the Statement does not consider what new rules are needed to address the so-called China-
specific issues. Many scholars believe that existing WTO rules are insufficient in handling the 
challenge of China, which as a non-market economy does not fit with the multilateral trading 
system built on market economy principles.24 As we have argued in detail elsewhere, however, 
existing WTO rules, including China-specific ones, may have provided sufficient tools to deal with 
the trade-distorting conduct of Chinese SOEs25 or the alleged “forced” technology transfer.26 The 
issue, therefore, may not be the lack of rules but the lack of utilization of the existing rules. As 
demonstrated by China’s experience during and after its accession to the WTO, China has been 
willing to accept restraints on its national policies according to multilateral rules and to comply 
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with unfavourable rulings of WTO tribunals.27 Thus, it is much preferable to use WTO law and 
litigation to discipline China’s trade policies. But this approach has been abandoned by the current 
US Administration, which chose to resort to unilateralism rather than multilateralism to resolve 
trade tensions. One argument for the need of new rules would be that the existing rules may be 
further elaborated to enhance their efficacy. Examples of this include Section 9.1 of the Protocol 
on the Accession of China28  and Paragraph 46 of the Report of the Working Party on the 
Accession of China.29 The former requires China to ensure all prices for goods and services in all 
sectors are determined by market forces; and the latter prevents the Chinese government from 
influencing commercial decisions of SOEs and state-invested enterprises. While these obligations 
provide abundant flexibility for WTO Members to challenge a wide range of protectionist and 
trade distortive policies and practices of the Chinese government including via state entities, they 
could still be improved through the elaboration of more detailed legal criteria for Members and 
WTO tribunals to apply, such as specific factors for determining whether Chinese prices are 
market prices or whether an SOE made a particular decision purely on a commercial basis.30 
Furthermore, new rules may be needed to address new situations or practices such as variations 
and developments in China’s industrial policies and subsidization and the lack of information on 
these measures. We will provide some illustrations on these issues in Section V.    
In short, the Statement fails to recognise that the existing WTO rules, as interpreted and applied 
by WTO tribunals, may have already provided the policy space needed by governments, both to 
pursue chosen non-protectionist objectives as well as to counter the effects of foreign measures. 
It fails to account for the efficacy of the existing rules in dealing with the China challenge. Instead, 
by encouraging the parties to negotiate bilateral deals in total disregard of existing WTO rules, the 
Statement only works to further undermine the multilateral trading system. 
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK 
An alternative framework is needed to guide the parties to negotiate specific disciplines on all sorts 
of protectionist measures and the policy space needed especially in the areas where the systemic 
issues arise. Our framework is not intended to impose undue restrictions on the regulatory 
autonomy of the parties. Instead, we seek to strike a proper balance between disciplining 
protectionism and preserving policy space in line with the approach taken by WTO rules and 
jurisprudence. This balance could be achieved by drawing on the theoretical guidance emanating 
from the Theory of Distortions and Welfare (Theory). 31  Ultimately, we believe the bilateral 
                                                        
27  Weihuan Zhou, China’s Implementation of the Rulings of the World Trade Organization (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: 
Hart Publishing, 2019). 
28  See Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China (WT/L/432 23 Nov. 2001) [hereinafter Accession Protocol]. 
29  See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China (WT/ACC/CHN/49 1 Oct. 2001) [hereinafter Working Party 
Report]. 
30  For a more detailed discussion of these rules, see above n 25, Zhou, Gao and Bai, ‘Building A Market Economy 
Through WTO-Inspired Reform of State-Owned Enterprises in China’, at 1011-4. 
31  This theory was consolidated by Professor Bhagwati in Jagdish N Bhagwati, ‘The Generalized Theory of 
Distortions and Welfare’ in Jagdish N. Bhagwati et al. (eds.) Trade balance of payments and growth: papers in International 
Economics in Honor of Charles P. Kindleberger (Amsterdam London: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1971) 69-90. For 
a review of the historical development of the theory and its applications, see Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Free Trade Today 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002). 




negotiation should lay the groundwork for broader negotiations under the WTO (rather than 
create a significant deviation from it).  
The Theory addresses one of the longest-standing criticisms of free trade, that is, trade 
liberalization may not enhance national welfare when a domestic externality or non-economic 
objective exists.32 It establishes two important propositions: (1) trade liberalization would remain 
welfare-enhancing if the externality or objective is tackled separately with an optimal or first-best 
policy instrument; and (2) the most economically efficient policy instrument is the one which 
strikes most directly at the source of the externality or objective. Therefore, in the pursuit of a 
domestic non-protectionist policy objective, the first-best policy would generally be a domestic 
instrument (e.g. internal tax or subsidy) which strikes directly at the locus of the problem, as 
opposed to a trade measure (e.g. an import tariff or quota). In other words, the more directly an 
instrument addresses the root of the problem, the more economically efficient it tends to be. When 
there is more than one externality/objective, the first-best policy would be the use of two or more 
domestic policy instruments tackling specifically the source of each externality/objective. A major 
qualification of the Theory concerns the side effects associated with the application of a first-best 
policy instrument. However, whether the existence of such side effects would render the optimal 
instrument economically inferior to other instruments requires careful assessment.33  
The Theory provides a framework for trade negotiations with two general steps:  
• first, trade negotiations must identify the externalities/objectives that governments need to 
address and allow the flexibility for governments to choose their own non-protectionist 
regulatory goals; and      
• second, trade negotiations should focus on governments’ choice of policy instruments in 
pursuit of their chosen goals taking into account the economic efficiency of the chosen 
instruments and their possible alternatives (as per the Theory), their effectiveness in fulfilling 
the goals, and the side effects of using a more optimal policy instrument.  
Based on this framework, trade negotiations will continue to further trade liberalization in a way 
that allows nations to gain from trade and enhance economic welfare. The reason why trade 
negotiation/cooperation is needed to achieve an economically preferable outcome is because 
governments may well succumb to the pressure of powerful interest groups (i.e. import-competing 
producers) to maximize short-term political gains (at the expense of the long-term national 
economic interest). As a result, the political choice of trade policies and policy instruments would 
not necessary follow the economic rationale; and the more economically efficient measures might 
just be less attractive politically.34 This suggests that in choosing policy instruments to pursue a 
given regulatory goal, the political preference would likely be compromised by protectionist 
interests. Trade negotiations provide an effective way for governments to resist protectionist 
pressure by incorporating the interest of anti-protectionist groups (e.g. exporters) into domestic 
political calculus.35  
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Compared with the Statement, our framework offers a better mechanism to facilitate the US-China 
trade negotiation. First and foremost, we draw a distinction between protectionist and non-
protectionist objectives and between policy objectives and policy instruments. We specifically 
target protectionism, the key problem that trade negotiators seek to address in reality. As discussed 
in Section II, we define “protectionism” in this paper to have a broad meaning encompassing all 
policies and policy instruments that tilt the conditions of competition in favour of domestic actors 
vis-à-vis their foreign competitors. Our focus is on the protective and trade distortive effect rather 
than the intent of such measures. Meanwhile, our framework recognizes the regulatory freedom of 
both countries in their choice of policy objectives and provides a platform for them to negotiate 
all sorts of policy instruments they may adopt to pursue the desired regulatory goals. It encourages 
the two governments to use the most economically efficient instruments while allowing the 
flexibility for them to justify the use of second-best means. In doing so, our framework would be 
more balanced by allowing sufficient but not excessive policy space and would lead the negotiation 
in a direction whereby both countries would gain from further trade liberalization and less 
disguised protectionism.  
Furthermore, our framework provides more substantive guidance for the bilateral negotiation. 
Instead of leaving the parties with unfettered latitude whereby they may agree to the use of a wide 
spectrum of protectionist instruments (subject to rebalancing), our framework offers economic 
guidance for them to determine how to restrain protectionism. Such guidance may be applied, for 
example, to all industrial policies that China employs to foster its high-tech industries. As 
demonstrated above, the steps of negotiation would involve (1) the identification of self-selected 
non-protectionist policy goals, and then (2) an assessment of whether the policy instrument(s) 
currently employed to pursue a given goal is the first-best means. More specifically, this latter step 
would involve sophisticated negotiations of why a sub-optimal measure has been applied, whether 
it could be replaced by an alternative means, etc. taking into account the impacts on trade and the 
capacity of the government concerned in accomplishing its chosen objectives. 
Finally, our framework would avoid WTO-illegal outcomes. As observed in Section III, the design 
of the WTO rules is consistent with the economic rationale of the Theory by regulating policy 
instruments according to their respective welfare costs. In cases involving trade and non-trade 
values, the judicial approaches and decisions of WTO tribunals, particularly those of the Appellate 
Body, have also been largely consistent with the economic rationale.36 Our framework is intended 
to achieve the same balance that the WTO rules are designed to achieve and therefore would be 
inherently WTO-consistent. To minimise any incidental WTO-inconsistencies in practice, the 
negotiations must also involve consideration of whether the policy instruments that the parties 
agree to use for chosen non-protectionist regulatory goals may breach WTO rules.    
V. A WAY OUT FOR THE TRADE WAR 
To illustrate the practical application of our framework, we use the recently-concluded US-China 
Phase One trade deal as an example. The deal covers many areas, which can be largely grouped 
under two categories: market access and rules issues. The market access commitments are 
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supposed to solve the trade imbalance problem, which is what prompted President Trump to 
launch the trade war in the first place. Technically speaking, however, all the additional tariffs 
imposed by the US over the past two years were triggered by the rules issues. This is because their 
justifications were provided by the Section 301 Report into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices 
Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, which resulted from the 
investigation launched in August 2017 to address Chinese measures requiring “the transfer of 
American technology and intellectual property to enterprises in China”.37 
According to the Phase One trade deal, China has agreed to end its practice of ‘forced’ technology 
transfer. In essence, this issue concerns Chinese laws and practice which mandate, explicitly or 
implicitly, the transfer of technology by foreign companies to their Chinese partners in the course 
of foreign direct investment.38 However, China’s commitment in the deal does not necessarily 
mean that it has to abandon its overarching goal for technological development. To the contrary, 
China still retains considerable freedom to adopt policy instruments to pursue that goal so long as 
it does not have protectionist effects. To do this properly, we need to first identify the externalities 
retarding technological development. If the externality lies in the failure of the capital market to 
provide sufficient finance for research and development (R&D), then China could correct such 
market failures through measures such as higher tax incentive for R&D expenses deduction, more 
government investment in fundamental research, etc. If the externality lies in the lack of access to 
information and knowledge, then the Chinese government may take steps to enhance flow of 
information and knowledge without undermining the legitimate rights of other stakeholders. Both 
measures would address the chosen objective(s) more directly than ‘forced’ technology transfer 
and tend to be more efficient and less-trade-restrictive policy instruments. Indeed, China’s existing 
WTO commitments have included a general obligation to avoid  ‘forced’ technology transfer39 and 
recently China has revised its Foreign Investment Law40 (FIL) to better implement that obligation. 
However, as flagged in Section III, future negotiations could add more details to the existing 
commitment by imposing specific obligations on, for example, transparency to address the 
longstanding concern about implementation and enforcement, and a restriction on the abuse of 
national security as a justification for ‘forcing’ technology transfer. The Phase One deal has 
included a provision to ensure due process and transparency for US companies involved in 
administrative proceedings related to matters of technology transfer in China. However, in view 
of China’s past experience with its WTO transparency obligations,41 a more comprehensive and 
detailed transparency provision would probably be needed to tackle other potential issues in 
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China’s implementation of the FIL.42 The final outcome of the negotiation would be a compromise 
which strikes a balance between China’s pursuit of technological development and the protection 
of the legitimate interest of US firms. Where the Chinese subsidies have affected the competitive 
position of US firms, rebalancing could be achieved through the application of countervailing 
measures in accordance with relevant WTO rules.  
Another example is the alleged lack of access to the Chinese market by American farmers. This is 
why the deal includes substantive commitments by China to greatly expand purchase of US 
manufactured goods, agricultural goods, energy products and services for a total of at least $200 
billion over the 2017 baseline amount in 2020 and 2021. It remains to be seen whether China 
would fulfil this commitment and if so, how.43 It also remains unclear how China may implement 
this commitment without violating WTO rules such as the prohibition on quota under GATT 
Article XI, the MFN principle under Article I and the non-discriminatory administration of quota 
under Article XIII.44 What is clear is that this commitment is non-reciprocal and one-sided against 
China, and hence does not provide a balanced and long-term approach to the resolution of the 
bilateral trade tensions. Under our framework, instead of setting explicit import quotas, the two 
sides should first try to identify the problems under the current system that affects market access. 
For example, whether the lack of market access was due to high tariffs, restrictive non-tariff 
barriers such as arbitrary sanitary and phytosanitary measures without sufficient scientific 
justifications, or simply the result of pure market forces of supply and demand. Once the source 
of the problem is properly identified, the two sides can then try to negotiate a proper solution. For 
example, if high tariffs are the reason, then the US could request China to reduce its tariffs. But of 
course, this would need to be done on an MFN basis. At the same time, the US should also 
recognize legitimate Chinese interests. For example, China’s high tariffs could be due to the 
concern of the government over the livelihood of the farmers. In such case, the US could help 
China to design an appropriate farmers-support program, such as direct cash payment by 
government to farmers that is not tied with agricultural outputs, which would be less trade 
restrictive and more efficient than collecting tariffs from American farmers and then transferring 
the proceeds to the Chinese farmers. If China prefers to use trade measures, it could negotiate for 
the use of tariff-rate quotas or even special safeguard measures reserved for sensitive products, 
which would be more flexible and have minimal impacts on trade.45  
A final example would be China’s industrial policies which involve the use of a mix of policy 
instruments such as the provision of subsidies to and preferential treatment of strategic sectors.46 
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These policies have not been covered in the Phase One deal and will be subject to further 
negotiations. As flagged in Section III, new rules may be needed to address variations and 
developments in these policies. This may involve, inter alia, a more nuanced definition of SOEs, 
an expanded scope of subsidies, and enhanced transparency and access to information to reduce 
the difficulties for complaining countries to discharge the burden of proof on the above and other 
related issues.47 Under our framework, the bilateral talk should start by identifying the exact policy 
objectives that China seeks to pursue under the overall industrial development plan and then focus 
on those existing instruments of concern to the US by exploring alternative means to attain these 
objectives. In this article, we do not intend to offer a detailed analysis of all these systemic issues 
behind the US-China trade tensions and all the policy instruments that may need to be negotiated. 
Such an analysis will need to be deferred to another article. Here, our objective is to set out the 
general framework and to demonstrate how it may work in reality.  
In the longer term, we believe that the US-China negotiations should aim to lay the groundwork 
for more inclusive trade negotiations which eventually would contribute to re-invigorating the 
multilateral negotiations under the WTO. This is achievable if one considers the history of China’s 
negotiations for entry into the WTO which shows that a US-China bilateral deal is key to 
accomplishing a multilateral deal.48 The fact that both the bilateral and the multilateral negotiations 
now face new challenges does not mean that they are insurmountable. Our framework provides a 
starting point for the bilateral negotiation which should, in our view, contribute to and form an 
integral part of further negotiations on the multilateral basis.                
VI. CONCLUSION  
As it is often said, one should never let a good crisis go to waste. As all trade scholars would recall, 
it was, after all, the Second World War which prompted the establishment of the multilateral 
trading system. Likewise, the current US-China trade war also presents an excellent opportunity 
to reflect on the shortcomings of the current system and reform the rules of international trade. 
In the process, we must resist the temptation, as suggested by the Statement, to indulge the two 
big powers with too much “policy space”. Such a framework not only will not solve the problems, 
but also will create a dangerous precedent for bypassing existing rules in favour of more “policy 
spaces” for governments. This would, in turn, undermine the rules-based multilateral institution, 
and run contrary to the aim of “perpetual peace”, because the “state of peace must be formally 
instituted, for a suspension of hostilities is not in itself a guarantee of peace”.49 
While the US-China Phase One deal might or might not be the beginning of the end of the trade 
war, it definitely should mark the beginning of a long-running process of readjustment of the 
bilateral trade relationship. Such a process must be based upon the respect of multilateral rules and 
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institutions, because the world cannot afford to have its two largest economies openly flouting 
such rules and institutions, which provide the only foundations for a “perpetual peace”. 
